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Aesthetics	  ‒	  Wittgenstein’s	  Paradigm	  of	  	  
Philosophy?	  
Simo	  Säätelä	  
Consider	  the	  following	  two	  appraisals	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy:	  
It	  might	  be	  argued,	  however,	  that	  broadly	  understood	  there	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  aesthetics	   in	  
Wittgenstein’s	  works,	  and	  that	  aesthetics	  as	  he	  conceived	  it	   is	  the	  paradigm	  of	  philosophy,	  
also	  as	  he	  conceived	  it.	  (Barrett	  [1967]:	  158)	  
But	  what	   I	  wish	   to	  underscore	   is	   how	   tightly	  Wittgenstein	  draws	   the	  parallel	   between	   […]	  
features	  of	  the	  Übersichtlichkeit	  of	  mathematical	  proof	  and	  features	  of	  «perspicuous	  presen-­‐
tations	   [Übersichtliche	   Darstellungen]»,	   in	   philosophical	   investigations	   ‒	   for	   this	   indicates	  
one	  way	   in	  which	  Wittgenstein’s	  discussions	  of	  mathematics	  come	  to	  epitomize	  all	  his	  phi-­‐
losophy.	  (Floyd	  [2000]:	  237)	  
Surely	   this	   sounds	   contradictory:	   how	   could	   both	   aesthetics	   and	   mathematics	   be	  
thought	  of	  as	  paradigms	  of	  philosophy?	  Or	  perhaps	  Barrett	  and	  Floyd	  are	  talking	  about	  
quite	   different	   aspects	   of	   Wittgenstein’s	   philosophy?	   However,	   Wittgenstein	   himself	  
seems	  to	  have	  thought	  there	  is	  some	  kind	  of	  important	  similarity	  here,	  as	  we	  can	  see	  from	  
this	  notebook	  entry	  from	  1937:	  
The	   strange	   resemblance	   [die	   seltsame	   Ähnlichkeit]	   between	   a	   philosophical	   investigation	  
(perhaps	  especially	   in	  mathematics)	  and	  an	  aesthetic	  one	   (E.g.	  what	   is	  bad	  about	   this	  gar-­‐
ment,	  how	  it	  should	  be,	  etc..).	  (Wittgenstein,	  MS	  116,56;	  Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  29)1	  
Why	  did	  Wittgenstein	  make	  this	  remark?	  I	  take	  that	  it	  is	  uncontroversial	  to	  assume	  that	  
he	   is	  here	  not	   reflecting	  upon	  philosophy	   in	  general,	  but	   that	   the	   remark	   shows	  how	  he	  
 
1	  I	  have	  modified	  Winch’s	  translation	  from	  the	  second	  edition	  of	  Culture	  and	  value,	  since	  it	  is	  im-­‐
portant	   that	  Wittgenstein	   does	   not	  write	   «one	   in	   aesthetics»	   (i.e.	   an	   «investigation	   in	   aesthe-­‐
tics»)	  as	  Winch	  has	  it,	  but	  «an	  aesthetic	  one»	  («einer	  ästhetischen»),	  i.e.	  an	  «aesthetic	  investiga-­‐
tion».	  This	  means	  Wittgenstein	  is	  not	  talking	  about	  aesthetics	  as	  a	  subject	  matter,	  but	  about	  the	  
characteristics	  of	  the	  investigation.	  When	  quoting	  form	  the	  Nachlass,	  I	  have,	  when	  possible,	  used	  
existing	  translations	  (sometimes	  amending	  them).	  Otherwise,	  translations	  are	  my	  own.	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thought	   about	   his	   own	   work.	   Wittgenstein	   evidently	   wants	   to	   point	   to	   a	   similarity	   in	  
«method»	  or	  approach	  between	  what	  he	  calls	  aesthetics,	  and	  philosophy,	  i.e.	  a	  similari-­‐
ty	  in	  the	  investigation	  itself	  ‒	  he	  wants	  to	  say	  something	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  philosophi-­‐
cal	  activity,	  as	  he	  understands	  it,	  or	  at	  least	  point	  to	  important	  aspects	  of	  it.	  The	  remark	  
can	  be	  supplemented	  by	  an	  observation	  from	  1949,	  where	  Wittgenstein	  points	  to	  a	  simi-­‐
larity	  in	  the	  questions	  the	  investigation	  is	  supposed	  to	  resolve:	  
Scientific	  questions	  may	  interest	  me,	  but	  they	  never	  really	  grip/intrigue	  me.	  Only	  conceptual	  
&	  aesthetic	  questions	  have	  that	  effect	  on	  me.	  At	  bottom	  it	  leaves	  me	  cold	  whether	  scientific	  
problems	  are	  solved;	  but	  not	  those	  other	  questions.	  (MS	  138,5b;	  Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  91)	  
Wittgenstein	   thus	  wants	   to	  compare	  conceptual	   (philosophical)	  questions	  with	  aes-­‐
thetic	  questions,	  and	  distinguish	  them	  from	  scientific	  questions.	  But	  what	  are	  aesthetic	  
questions,	  and	  what	  sort	  of	  investigation	  can	  deal	  with	  them?	  And	  why	  is	  it	  specifically	  
the	   investigation	  of	  conceptual	   issues	   in	  mathematics	   that	  Wittgenstein	  wants	  to	  com-­‐
pare	  to	  «an	  aesthetic	  investigation»?	  
The	   fact	   that	  Wittgenstein	  himself	   attached	   importance	   to	   the	   remark	   is	   shown	  by	  
the	  fact	  that	  we	  can	  find	  a	  similar,	  but	  longer	  and	  sketchier	  version	  in	  another	  notebook	  
from	   the	   same	  period.	   This	   variant	   is	   probably	   a	   rough	   draft	   that	  Wittgenstein,	   in	   his	  
usual	  manner,	  worked	  on	  and	  revised:	  
The	  strange	  resemblance	  between	  a	  philosophical	   investigation	  (maybe	  especially	   in	  math-­‐
ematics)	  and	  an	  aesthetic	  one,	  for	   instance,	  what	   is	  bad	  about	  this	  garment,	  how	  it	  should	  
be,	  etc.	  
Also	  here	   it	   is	   said:	  »What	   still	  does	  not	   fit	  here?»	  and	  also	  here	   the	   less	   sensitive	  person	  
[das	   stumpfere	   Gefühl]	   says:	   »Everything	   is	   already	   in	   order».	   Nor	   must	   one	   in	   this	   case	  
throw	   away	   the	   false	   explanation,	   because	   it	   is	   useful	  when	   you	  want	   to	   find	   the	   correct	  
one/	  it	  leads	  a	  bit	  on	  the	  way	  towards	  the	  right	  one.	  
The	  similarity	  reaches	  very	  far.	  (MS	  119,	  88v-­‐89r)	  
What	  is	  an	  Aesthetic	  Investigation?	  
In	  spite	  of	  the	  extensive	  discussion	  concerning	  Wittgenstein's	  conception	  of	  philosophy	  this	  
particular	  remark	  has	  received	  relatively	  little	  attention.	  For	  instance	  Peter	  Winch	  ([1995]:	  
97)	  mentions	  it	  in	  passing,	  only	  to	  note	  that	  «it	  is	  clear	  that	  [Wittgenstein]	  has	  had	  some-­‐
thing	   technically	   methodological	   in	   mind»	   with	   this	   remark.	   However,	   Winch	   seems	   to	  
downplay	  the	  difficulties	   involved	   in	  understanding	  this	  comparison.	   In	  what	  sense	   is	   the	  
remark	  «technically	  methodological»?	  What	  aspects	  of	  the	  philosophical	  investigation	  is	  it	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supposed	  to	  highlight?	   In	  addition,	  Winch	  does	  not	  address	   the	  perhaps	  most	  perplexing	  
feature	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  remark,	  i.e.,	  the	  parenthesis	  about	  mathematics.	  
To	  make	   sense	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	   comparison	  between	  a	  philosophical	   investigation	  
and	  an	  aesthetic	  one	  (hereafter	  called	  «the	  aesthetic	  analogy»)	  we	  must	  first	  try	  to	  un-­‐
derstand	  what	  he	  might	  have	  meant	  by	  an	  «aesthetic	   investigation».	  It	  should	  be	  clear	  
that	  he	  cannot	  have	  philosophical	  aesthetics	  or	  the	  philosophy	  of	  art	  in	  mind	  when	  using	  
this	  expression;	  he	  is	  not	  talking	  about	  an	  investigation	  in	  aesthetics	  (i.e.	  referring	  to	  aes-­‐
thetics	  as	  a	  subject	  matter),	  but	  about	  an	  aesthetic	   investigation	  (i.e.	  characterising	  a	  cer-­‐
tain	  kind	  of	  investigation).	  Wittgenstein	  also	  gives	  a	  brief	  example	  ‒	  but	  in	  what	  sense	  are	  
appraisals	  of	  dresses	  and	  how	  they	  should	  be,	  what	  fits,	  etc.,	  «aesthetic	  investigations»?	  
We	  can	  turn	  to	  the	  lectures	  on	  aesthetics	  Wittgenstein	  gave	  in	  Cambridge	  the	  following	  
summer	  for	  an	  answer.	  Wittgenstein’s	  take	  on	  the	  subject	  in	  these	  lectures	  is	  quite	  un-­‐
orthodox,	  and	  he	  devotes	  at	  least	  as	  much	  time	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  suits,	  fashion,	  and	  
other	  examples	  of	  «everyday	  aesthetics»	  as	  to	  art.	  He	  also	  used	  the	  word	  «aesthetics»	  
in	  a	  rather	  peculiar	  sense:	  
I	  know	  exactly	  what	  happens	  when	  a	  person	  who	  knows	  a	  lot	  about	  suits	  goes	  to	  the	  tailor,	  
also	   I	   know	  what	  happens	  when	  a	  person	  who	  knows	  nothing	  about	   suits	  goes	  ‒	  what	  he	  
says,	  how	  he	  acts,	  etc.	  [Taylor’s	  notes:]	  That	  is	  aesthetics.	  (Wittgenstein	  [1938]:	  7)	  
It	  would	  of	  course	  be	  ridiculous	  to	  take	  this	  as	  a	  definition	  of	  «aesthetics»	  or	  as	  an	  il-­‐
lustration	   of	   an	   investigation	   in	   philosophical	   aesthetics.	   «Aesthetics»,	   as	  Wittgenstein	  
uses	  the	  word	  here,	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  a	  subject	  matter	  or	  branch	  of	  philosophy:	  instead,	  it	  
has	  to	  do	  with	  seeing	  that	  something	  fits	  or	  does	  not	  fit,	  that	  something	  is	  pleasing	  or	  dis-­‐
pleasing,	  beautiful	  or	  ugly	  ‒	  or	  noticing	  that	  a	  picture,	  a	  melody,	  or	  an	  architectural	  detail	  
«has	  the	  right	  expression»	  or	  «makes	  the	  right	  gesture»,	  or	  fails	  to	  do	  these	  things	  (Witt-­‐
genstein	  [1938]:	  31).	  It	  also	  has	  to	  do	  with	  understanding	  why	  something	  is	  right	  or	  wrong,	  
and	  giving	  reasons	  for	  this,	  and	  thus	  possibly	  changing	  a	  person’s	  way	  of	  perceiving	  things.	  
This	  is	  what	  Wittgenstein	  calls	  an	  «aesthetic	  investigation».	  For	  instance,	  if	  someone	  «less	  
sensitive»	  says	  that	  something	  is	  all	  right	  (cfr.	  MS	  119,	  89r,	  quoted	  above),	  then	  a	  person	  
with	  a	  more	  developed	  sensibility	  might	  try	  to	  get	  him	  to	  see	  that	  something	  is	  still	  missing	  
or	  wrong.	  
But	  what	  is	  an	  «aesthetic	  investigation»	  more	  exactly?	  It	  can	  have	  to	  do	  with	  an	  at-­‐
tempt	   to	   locate	   the	   source	   of	  what	  Wittgenstein	   often	   calls	   «aesthetic	   perplexity»	   or	  
«aesthetic	  puzzlement».	  By	  an	  «aesthetic	  puzzle»	  Wittgenstein	  means	  for	  example	  situ-­‐
ations	  where	   I	   feel	  dissatisfaction,	  unease	  or	  even	  disgust	  at	  something	  but	  am	  uncer-­‐
tain	  why	  I	  have	  such	  a	  reaction,	  or	  cases	  where	  a	  melody,	  a	  picture,	  a	  building,	  etc.	  has	  a	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certain	  effect	  upon	  me	  but	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  for	  me	  why.	  Consider	  the	  following	  example:	  an	  
architect	  is	  designing	  a	  door	  by	  letting	  someone	  else	  sketch	  its	  outline	  on	  a	  wall.	  The	  archi-­‐
tect	  is	  looking	  at	  it	  and	  saying:	  «Higher,	  higher…	  oh,	  all	  right».	  Here,	  the	  initial	  discontent	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  eventual	  satisfaction	  with	  getting	  it	  right,	  Wittgenstein	  said,	  may	  be	  called	  «aes-­‐
thetic	   reactions»	   (see	  Wittgenstein	   [1938]:	   13;	   for	   a	   more	   detailed	   discussion	   of	   	   why	  
Wittgenstein	  wants	   to	  emphasize	   the	   importance	  of	  «aesthetic	   reactions»,	  see	  Säätela	  
[2002]).	  The	  situation	  also	  gives	  an	  example	  of	  a	  solution	  of	  an	  «aesthetic	  puzzle».	  The	  ar-­‐
chitect	  feels	  discomfort	  with	  the	  door,	  because	  it	  is	  too	  low.	  This	  means	  that	  he	  has	  solved	  
the	  puzzle	  by	   locating	   the	   reason	   for	  his	  discomfort.	  What	   is	   central	   for	  Wittgenstein	   is	  
that	  we	  are	  not	  looking	  for	  causes	  here,	  instead,	  what	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  are	  reasons.	  
The	   reaction	   is	   «directed»	   ‒	   it	   has	   an	   object	   (the	   door);	  Wittgenstein	   says	   there	  «is	   a	  
“Why?”	  to	  aesthetic	  discomfort	  not	  a	  “cause”	  to	  it»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1938]:	  14-­‐15).	  A	  reason	  
entails	  one’s	  agreeing	  with	  it,	  whereas	  a	  cause	  is	  found	  out	  experimentally.	  An	  «aesthet-­‐
ic	  investigation»	  has	  to	  do	  with	  understanding	  and	  describing	  this	  kind	  of	  reasons.	  Witt-­‐
genstein	  also	   thought	   that	  psychoanalytic	  explanations	   should	  be	  compared	  with	   such	  
aesthetic	   investigations	   instead	   of	   being	   misunderstood	   as	   scientific,	   causal	   explana-­‐
tions:	  	  	  
The	   success	   of	   the	   analysis	   is	   supposed	   to	   be	   shown	  by	   the	   person's	   agreement.	   There	   is	  
nothing	  corresponding	  to	  this	  in	  physics.	  Of	  course	  we	  can	  give	  causes	  for	  our	  laughter,	  but	  
whether	  those	  are	  in	  fact	  the	  causes	  is	  not	  shown	  by	  the	  person's	  agreement	  that	  they	  are.	  
A	  cause	   is	   found	  experimentally.	  The	  psychoanalytic	  way	  of	   finding	  why	  a	  person	   laughs	   is	  
analogous	  to	  an	  aesthetic	  investigation.	  For	  the	  correctness	  of	  an	  aesthetic	  analysis	  must	  be	  
agreement	  of	  the	  person	  to	  whom	  the	  analysis	  is	  given.	  (Wittgenstein	  [1932-­‐1935]:	  14)	  
«A	  Synopsis	  of	  Trivialities»	  
What,	  then,	  is	  the	  point	  of	  comparing	  this	  kind	  of	  investigation	  with	  a	  philosophical	  investi-­‐
gation?	   Does	   Wittgenstein's	   own	   approach	   give	   examples	   of	   how	   he	   perceived	   this	  
«strange	  resemblance»?	  He	  did	  not	  explicitly	  take	  up	  this	  analogy	  in	  his	  lectures	  on	  aes-­‐
thetics	   in	   1938	   or	   his	   lectures	   on	   the	   foundations	   of	  mathematics	   the	   following	   year.	  
However,	  he	  did	  compare	  aesthetics	  both	  with	  mathematics	  and	  philosophy	  earlier,	  during	  
his	  1930-­‐1933	  lectures,	  and	  here	  the	  «methodological»	  dimension	  of	  the	  analogy	  is	  quite	  
explicit.	  We	  can	  assume	  that	  he	  is	  alluding	  to	  this	  kind	  of	  similarities	  in	  his	  1937	  remarks	  as	  
well.	  What	  is	  very	  clear	  in	  the	  1930-­‐1933	  lectures	  is	  his	  insistence	  upon	  that	  he	  had	  found	  a	  
new,	  revolutionary	  method	  in	  philosophy.	  He	  even	  talked	  about	  it	  in	  the	  same	  terms	  as	  a	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revolution	  in	  science.	  But	  as	  G.	  E.	  Moore	  points	  out,	  Wittgenstein	  was	  not	  very	  clear	  as	  to	  
what	  this	  «new	  method»	  amounted	  to,	  though	  he	  «gave	  some	  hints	  as	  to	  its	  nature»:	  
He	  also	  said	  that	  he	  was	  not	  trying	  to	  teach	  us	  any	  new	  facts:	  that	  he	  would	  only	  tell	  us	  «triv-­‐
ial	  things	  ‒	  Things	  we	  all	  know	  already»;	  but	  that	  the	  difficult	  thing	  was	  to	  get	  a	  «synopsis»	  
of	  these	  trivialities,	  and	  that	  our	  «intellectual	  discomfort»	  can	  only	  be	  removed	  by	  a	  synopsis	  
of	  many	  trivialities	  [....]	  I	  imagine,	  that	  it	  was	  in	  this	  respect	  of	  needing	  a	  synopsis	  of	  triviali-­‐
ties	  that	  he	  thought	  philosophy	  was	  similar	  to	  Ethics	  and	  Aesthetics.	  (Moore	  [1955]:	  114)	  
Since	  this	  kind	  of	  «synopsis	  of	  trivialities»	  is	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  light	  of	  aesthet-­‐
ics	  we	  can	  assume	  that	  at	  least	  one	  important	  aspect	  of	  it	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  kind	  of	  rea-­‐
sons	  Wittgenstein	  thinks	  are	  given	  in	  aesthetics.	  Indeed,	  Moore	  reports:	  
Reasons,	  he	  said,	  in	  Aesthetics,	  are	  «of	  the	  nature	  of	  further	  descriptions»;	  e.g.	  you	  can	  make	  a	  
person	  see	  what	  Brahms	  was	  driving	  at	  by	  showing	  him	  lots	  of	  different	  pieces	  by	  Brahms,	  or	  
by	  comparing	  him	  with	  a	  contemporary	  author;	  and	  all	  that	  Aesthetics	  does	  is	  to	  «draw	  your	  
attention	  to	  a	  thing»,	  to	  «place	  things	  side	  by	  side».	  He	  said	  that	  if,	  by	  giving	  «reasons»	  of	  this	  
sort,	  you	  make	  another	  person	  «see	  what	  you	  see»	  but	  it	  still	  «doesn’t	  appeal	  to	  him»,	  that	  is	  
«an	  end»	  of	  the	  discussion	  [...].	  And	  he	  said	  that	  the	  same	  sort	  of	  «reasons»	  were	  given,	  not	  
only	  in	  Ethics,	  but	  also	  in	  Philosophy.	  (Moore	  [1955]:	  106)	  
This	   is	  an	   important	  clue	  to	  how	  to	  understand	  the	  aesthetic	  analogy:	  Wittgenstein	  
hints	  that	  both	  aesthetic	  and	  philosophical	   (as	  well	  as	  ethical)	  puzzlements	  can	  be	  dis-­‐
solved	  or	  explained	  by	  certain	  kinds	  of	  reasons,	  by	  drawing	  attention	  to	  certain	  features	  
or	  placing	  «things	  side	  by	  side».	  Also	  in	  the	  1938	  lectures	  he	  said	  that	  «what	  we	  really	  
want,	  to	  solve	  aesthetic	  puzzlements,	  is	  certain	  comparisons	  ‒	  grouping	  together	  of	  cer-­‐
tain	   cases»	   (Wittgenstein	   [1938]:	   29),	   and	   (again	   referring	   to	  Brahms)	  he	  developed	  a	  
similar	  example	  of	  an	  «aesthetic	   investigation»	   that	   is	   supposed	   to	  give	  us	   the	  kind	  of	  
answer	  we	  want	  when	  we	  are	  «puzzled	  about	  aesthetic	  impressions»,	  e.g.	  «Why	  do	  the-­‐
se	  bars	  give	  me	  such	  a	  peculiar	  impression?»:	  
As	  far	  as	  one	  can	  see	  the	  puzzlement	  I	  am	  talking	  about	  can	  be	  cured	  only	  by	  peculiar	  kinds	  
of	  comparisons,	  e.g.	  by	  an	  arrangement	  of	  certain	  musical	  figures,	  comparing	  their	  effect	  on	  
us.	  When	  the	  written	  notes	  or	  the	  played	  notes	  are	  spread	  out,	  then	  you	  say:	  «If	  we	  put	  in	  
this	  chord	  it	  does	  not	  have	  that	  effect;	  if	  we	  put	  in	  that	  cord	  it	  does».	  (Wittgenstein	  [1938]:	  
20)	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It	   is	  such	  a	  surveyable	  or	  perspicuous	  representation,	  achieved	  in	  this	  case	  quite	  lit-­‐
erally	   by	   «spreading	  out»	   the	  different	  versions	   that	  are	   to	  be	  compared,	   that	  Wittgen-­‐
stein	  wants	  to	  call	  a	  «synopsis»	  or,	  in	  German,	  eine	  übersichtliche	  Darstellung2.	  
An	  «aesthetic	  investigation»,	  according	  to	  Wittgenstein,	  can	  thus	  give	  us	  reasons	  for	  
why	  e.g.	   a	  particular	  word	   is	  used	   in	  a	  particular	  place	   in	  a	  poem,	  or	  why	  a	  particular	  
door	   should	  be	  precisely	   so-­‐and-­‐so	  high	   (or	  why	   there	   is	   something	  wrong	  with	   these	  
details).These	  reasons	  do	  not	  give	  us	  new	   information,	  but	  make	  us	  notice	  aspects	  we	  
have	   neglected.	   This	   means	   that	   an	   aesthetic	   investigation,	   in	   Wittgenstein’s	   sense,	  
bears	   a	   close	   similarity	   to	   a	   philosophical	   investigation	   (also	   in	  Wittgenstein’s	   sense):	  
both	  aim	  at	  putting	  things	  «side	  by	  side»	  and	  change	  one’s	  way	  of	  perceiving.	  	  
An	  example	  of	  an	  «aesthetic	   investigation»	   that	   is	  particularly	   interesting	   from	   this	  
perspective	   is	   art	   criticism,	  which	  demands	   that	   the	   critic	   expresses	  his	   own	  aesthetic	  
reactions,	  and	  attempts	  to	  formulate	  reasons	  for	  what	  he	  wants	  to	  say	  about	  a	  particu-­‐
lar	  work	  of	  art.	  The	  point	  of	  an	  «aesthetic	   investigation»	   is	  often	  to	  change	  a	  person’s	  
way	  of	  looking	  ‒	  you	  want	  to	  get	  him	  to	  see	  what	  you	  see,	  to	  appreciate	  what	  you	  are	  
appreciating.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  this,	  he	  has	  to	  notice	  what	  is	  there,	  in	  plain	  view	  (cfr.	  aspect-­‐
change	  and	  the	  duck-­‐rabbit).	  What	  is	  important	  is	  that	  I	  cannot	  prove	  that	  I	  perceive	  the	  
object	  correctly,	  but	   I	  can,	  by	  giving	  different	  kinds	  of	  reasons,	  try	  to	  get	  somebody	  to	  
see	  it	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  I	  do.	  According	  to	  Wittgenstein	  something	  similar	  also	  charac-­‐
terizes	   a	   philosophical	   investigation	   and	   its	   results.	   Stanley	   Cavell	   in	   particular	   has	  
stressed	   the	   similarity	   in	   «grammar»	   between	   aesthetic	   judgements	   and	   the	   kind	   of	  
philosophical	   claims	   that	   appeal	   to	   «what	   we	  would	   say	  when».	   Cavell	   also	  wants	   to	  
connect	  this	  to	  the	  Kantian	  idea	  that	  the	  aesthetic	  judgement	  postulates	  a	  «we»,	  it	  has	  a	  
claim	  to	  universality,	  but	  cannot	  demand	  agreement	  (like	  a	  logical	  judgement).	  We	  can	  
often	  formulate	  reasons	  for	  why	  we	  think	  something	  is	  beautiful,	  but	  the	  reasons	  come	  
to	  an	  end	   if	   you	  cannot	  get	  a	  person	   to	  «see	  what	  you	  see».	  Something	  similar	   is,	  ac-­‐
cording	   to	   Cavell,	   the	   case	   in	   philosophy	   of	   the	   type	   Wittgenstein	   is	   practising,	   and	  
which	  appeals	  to	  «what	  we	  would	  say	  when»	  (see	  e.g.	  Cavell	  [1969]:	  73-­‐96).	  
 
2	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  translation	  of	  «übersichtliche	  Darstellung»	  that	  Wittgenstein	  himself	  
favored	  was	  «a	  synopsis»	  or	  «a	  synoptic	  view»	  (see	  	  Pichler	  [2004]:	  183).	  Indeed,	  this	  translation	  
avoids	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  we	  get	  if	  we	  use	  the	  translation	  «perspicuous	  representation»,	  es-­‐
tablished	  by	   	  Anscombe	  ‒	  we	  do	  not	  have	   to	  do	  with	   the	  «mirroring»	  or	   representation	  of	   so-­‐
mething	  that	   is	  already	  there,	  to	  be	  represented;	  in	  addition,	  a	  Darstellung	  has	  the	  connotation	  
of	  activity,	  of	  something	  carred	  out	  (I’m	  indebted	  to	  Klaus	  Puhl	  for	  stressing	  this	  point).	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Summing	  up,	  the	  most	  salient	  points	  of	  comparison	  between	  investigations	  in	  philos-­‐
ophy	  and	  aesthetics	  are	  that:	  
-­‐	  patterns	  of	  argument	  and	  possibilities	  of	  achieving	  agreement	  are	  similar.	  
-­‐	  the	  investigation	  looks	  for	  reasons,	  not	  causes,	  and	  the	  reasons	  that	  can	  be	  given	  are	  
similar.	  
-­‐	   the	   idea	  of	  a	  «synopsis	  of	  trivialities»	  or	  «surveyable	  representation»	  applies	  to	  both	  
kinds	  of	  investigations.	  
-­‐	  the	  nature	  of	  questions	  in	  aesthetics	  and	  philosophy	  are	  similar;	  we	  do	  not	  have	  to	  do	  
with	   problems	   (that	   have	   a	   substantial	   answer	   and	   that	   can	   be	   solved	   by	   new	   infor-­‐
mation	  and/or	  appealing	  to	  theory	  or	  experiments)	  but	  puzzles	  (where	  you	  have	  all	  the	  
information	   you	   need,	   but	   you	  must	   «get»	   the	   point;	   for	   a	   further	   discussion	   of	   this	  
point,	  see	  Säätelä	  [2011]).	  
-­‐	   the	  result	  of	   the	   investigation	  (e.g.,	   locating	  the	  reason	  for	  one’s	  puzzlement)	  can	  be	  
the	  changing	  of	  one’s	  perception,	  and	  this	  kind	  of	  change	   in	  perception	  or	  aspect	  also	  
has	  the	  potential	  to	  remove	  our	  discomfort,	  and	  free	  us	  from	  misleading	  pictures	  (so	  it	  
can	  be	  in	  a	  sense	  “therapeutic”).	  
The	  Context	  of	  the	  Aesthetic	  Analogy	  
My	  claim	  so	  far	  is	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  notion	  of	  eine	  übersichtliche	  Darstellung	  can	  be	  un-­‐
derstood	  as	  an	  «aesthetic»	  one	  (in	  Wittgenstein’s	  sense	  of	  the	  word),	  and	  that	  it	  is	  this	  kind	  
of	  «strange	  resemblance»	  that	  Wittgenstein	  is	  alluding	  to.	  Now	  that	  we	  have	  given	  a	  partial	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  analogy,	  the	  next	  thing	  to	  ask	  is	  why	  Wittgenstein	  formulated	  it	  in	  late	  
autumn	  of	  1937.	  It	  is	  tempting	  to	  read	  this	  remark	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  free-­‐standing	  aphorism	  on	  
philosophy,	  and	  understand	  it	  as	  a	  description,	  or	  «constative»	  utterance,	  the	  truth	  value	  of	  
which	  we	  can	  discuss:	   	   Is	   it	  true	  of	  all	  of	  philosophy?	  –	  Hardly;	  Is	   it	  true	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  
own	  way	  of	  proceeding	  in	  philosophy?	  –	  In	  that	  case,	  does	  it	  apply	  to	  his	  philosophy	  as	  a	  
whole,	  or	  certain	  parts	  of	  it?;	  etc.	  	  However,	  if	  we	  want	  to	  be	  true	  to	  the	  spirit	  of	  Wittgen-­‐
stein’s	  way	  of	  doing	  philosophy,	  we	  should	  realize	  that	  such	  questions	  are	  not	  answerable	  
unless	  we	  place	  the	  utterance	  in	  a	  context,	  and	  look	  at	  the	  reasons	  for,	  and	  circumstances	  
in	  which	  it	  was	  actually	  produced,	   i.e.,	  take	  note	  of	  what	  could	  be	  called	  its	  performative	  
aspects.	  
It	  is,	  of	  course,	  quite	  possible	  that	  Wittgestein	  wanted	  to	  make	  a	  general	  statement	  
about	   (his)	   philosophy.	   Indeed,	  when	  G.H.	  von	  Wright	  decided	   to	  publish	   the	   remark	   in	  
Culture	  and	  Value,	  he	  obviously	  thought	  that	  this	  is	  a	  remark	  of	  a	  general	  nature,	  that	  can	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be	  separated	  from	  the	  text	  surrounding	  it	  (see	  von	  Wright’s	  preface	  in	  Wittgenstein	  [1998]:	  
IX).	  However,	  even	  if	  the	  analogy	  at	  a	  first	  glance	  seems	  to	  be	  quite	  self-­‐contained,	  there	  
are	  no	  clear	  indications	  in	  the	  manuscripts	  that	  Wittgenstein	  would	  have	  wanted	  to	  mark	  it	  
off	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  text.	  We	  must	  also	  take	  note	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  Wittgenstein	  made	  this	  
remark	   in	  two	  different	  manuscripts,	  and	  that	  the	  surrounding	  philosophical	  discussion	   is	  
more	  or	  less	  the	  same	  in	  both	  (so	  this	  part	  of	  MS	  116	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  reworking	  of	  the	  corre-­‐
sponding	  passages	  in	  MS	  119).	  This	  indicates	  that	  the	  analogy,	  in	  spite	  of	  superficially	  being	  
a	  self-­‐sufficient	  aphoristic	  reflection	  upon	  philosophy,	  is	  indeed	  a	  direct	  commentary	  to	  the	  
matters	  under	  discussion	  in	  these	  particular	  notebooks.	  
Thus	  we	   should	   take	   a	   closer	   look	   at	   the	   immediate	   context	   of	   the	   utterance	   in	   the	  
manuscript	  texts	  in	  which	  it	  occurs.	  A	  part	  of	  the	  discussion	  surrounding	  the	  analogy	  reoc-­‐
curs	  in	  Zettel	  (§§	  258-­‐273),	  but	  the	  remark	  about	  the	  «strange	  resemblance»	  is	  not	  includ-­‐
ed	  in	  that	  fragment.	  The	  discussion	  revolves	  around	  making	  sense	  of	  concepts,	  and	  the	  lim-­‐
its	  of	  sense.	  Wittgenstein	  writes	  here,	  among	  other	  things,	  that	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  
sense	  of	  a	  sentence,	  we	  must	  look	  at	  how	  the	  sentence	  is	  used.	  What	  do	  the	  surroundings	  
of	  the	  sentence	  look	  like?	  Grammar,	  he	  says,	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  «the	  account	  books	  of	  lan-­‐
guage»,	  and	  the	  interpretation	  of	  a	  sentence	  «is	  its	  surroundings	  in	  the	  grammar».	  The	  im-­‐
portant	  thing	  to	  take	  note	  of	  is	  how	  you	  use	  language;	  «What	  you	  do	  with	  a	  word	  teaches	  
me	  how	  you	  understand	  it»	  (MS	  116,47	  ;	  MS	  119,82r).	  He	  also	  considers	  how	  one	  could	  ar-­‐
gue	  against	  the	  use	  of	  wrong	  concepts,	  especially	  in	  discussions	  about	  mathematics:	  	  
I	  could	  say:	  Your	  concept	  is	  wrong.	  ‒	  However,	  the	  issue	  does	  not	  get	  cleared	  up	  by	  fulminating	  
against	  your	  words,	  but	  only	  by	  investigating	  how	  you	  use	  your	  words	  and	  by	  trying	  to	  turn	  your	  
attention	  away	  from	  certain	  words,	  illustrations,	  images,	  and	  towards	  the	  use	  of	  the	  words.	  (MS	  
116,	  53-­‐54	  ;	  MS	  119,	  90r;	  	  cfr.	  Wittgenstein	  [1929-­‐1948]:	  §463)	  	  
The	  discussion	  in	  these	  passages	  is	  quite	  interesting	  in	  itself,	  but	  here	  we	  must	  concen-­‐
trate	  on	  Wittgenstein's	   possible	   reasons	   to	   interpolate	   the	   aesthetic	   analogy	   into	   it.	   The	  
connection	  is	  not	  immediately	  obvious,	  but	  I	  want	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  aesthetic	  analogy	  must	  
be	  seen	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  a	  quotation	  from	  Hardy,	  that	  immediately	  precedes	  it	  
in	  both	  manuscripts:	  
Hardy	  says	  in	  the	  paper	  Mathematical	  Proof:	  «That	  “the	  finite	  cannot	  understand	  the	  infinite”	  
should	  surely	  be	  a	  theological	  and	  not	  a	  mathematical	  war	  cry».	  It	  is	  true	  that	  this	  expression	  is	  
infelicitous.	  But	  what	  people	  using	   it	  want	   to	   say	  with	   it	   is:	   «We	  have	   to	  deal	  with	   the	   right	  
things	  here.	  Whence	  this	  leap	  from	  the	  finite	  to	  the	  infinite?».	  Nor	  is	  this	  a	  completely	  nonsen-­‐
sical	  expression	  ‒	  only	  the	  “finite”,	  that	  is	  not	  supposed	  to	  be	  able	  to	  think	  the	  infinite	  ‒	  is	  not	  
“the	  human	  being”,	  or	  “our	  understanding”,	  but	  the	  symbolism,	  the	  calculus.	  And	  precisely	  how	  
this	  conceives	  the	  “infinite”	  is	  well	  worth	  an	  investigation.	  And	  such	  an	  investigation	  should	  be	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compared	  to	  the	  thorough	  investigation	  and	  clarification	  of	  the	  management	  of	  a	  business	  by	  a	  
chartered	  accountant.	  The	  goal	   is	  a	  surveyable	  and	  comparative	  presentation	   [eine	  übersicht-­‐
liche	  vergleichende	  Darstellung]	  of	  all	  applications,	  illustrations,	  and	  conceptions	  of	  the	  calculus.	  
An	  all-­‐sided	  lighting	  (because	  a	  one-­‐sided	  lighting	  also	  throws	  a	  shadow).	  A	  complete	  overview	  
[Übersicht]	   of	   everything	   that	  might	  produce	  unclarity.	  And	   this	   overview	  must	   cover	   a	  wide	  
domain,	  because	   the	   roots	  of	  our	   ideas	   reach	   far.	   Such	  a	  distinction	   is	  difficult.	   ‒	  «The	   finite	  
cannot	  understand	  the	  infinite»	  means:	   it	  cannot	  work	   in	  the	  way	  you,	  with	  characteristic	  su-­‐
perficiality,	  present	  it.	  (MS	  116,	  55;	  cfr.	  MS	  119,	  84v-­‐85v;	  Wittgenstein	  [1929-­‐1948]:	  §	  273)	  
But	   if	   this	  reflection	  prompts	  Wittgenstein	  to	  formulate	  the	  aesthetic	  analogy,	  does	  
he	  really	  want	  to	  claim	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  investigation	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  mathematics	  
exhibits	  a	  «strange	  resemblance»	  to	  an	  aesthetic	  investigation?	  The	  kind	  of	  philosophi-­‐
cal	  investigation	  he	  alludes	  to	  here	   is	  a	  kind	  of	  investigation	  that	  aims	  at	  a	  «surveyable	  
representation»	  or	  «overview».	  However,	  here	  Wittgenstein	   seems	   to	  present	  a	  more	  
systematic	  and	  «non-­‐aesthetic»	  understanding	  of	  this	  notion,	  comparing	  it	  to	  the	  going	  
through	  of	  the	  account	  books	  or	  management	  of	  a	  business.	  But	  does	  not	  the	  compari-­‐
son	  of	  the	  philosopher’s	  activity	  to	  that	  of	  a	  «chartered	  accountant»	  undermine	  my	  in-­‐
terpretation	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  analogy	  rather	  than	  support	   it?	  As	  a	  reply	  to	  this,	   I	  would	  
venture	   to	   claim	   that	  Wittgenstein	   formulates	   the	   aesthetic	   analogy	   as	   an	  alternative	  
view	  of	   how	   to	   understand	   the	   notion	   of	   «eine	   übersichtliche	  Darstellung»	   –	   not	   as	   a	  
systematic	  «overview»	  aspiring	  to	  completeness	  and	  an	  «all-­‐sided	   lighting»,	  but	  rather	  
as	   the	   kind	   of	   «aesthetic»	   way	   of	   seeing	   things	   together,	   opening	   up	   new	   aspects	  
through	  close	  attention	  to	  particulars	  that	  we	  outlined	  above.	  I	  think	  this	  interpretation	  
can	   be	   supported	   if	   we	   take	   note	   of	  Wittgenstein’s	   own	   philosophical	   activity	   at	   the	  
time.	  The	  remarks	  containing	  the	  aesthetic	  analogy	  are	  especially	  interesting	  because	  they	  
are	  written	  in	  late	  autumn	  of	  1937	  when	  Wittgenstein	  was	  working	  on	  an	  early	  version	  of	  
what	  we	  now	  know	  as	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations3.	  
The	  Aesthetic	  Analogy	  and	  the	  Method	  of	  the	  Investigations	  
Let	  us,	  then,	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  aesthetic	  analogy	  and	  Witt-­‐
genstein’s	  philosophical	  work	   in	   the	  period	  surrounding	   its	   formulation.	   	  As	  we	  noted,	  
the	  connection	  between	  aesthetics	  and	  the	   idea	  of	  a	  «synopsis	  of	   trivialities»	  or	  «eine	  
 
3	  Regarding	  the	  dating:	  the	  remark	  containing	  the	  analogy	  in	  MS	  119	  is	  (in	  the	  manuscript)	  dated	  
«1.11	  (1937)».	  MS	  116	  is	  from	  the	  same	  period,	  but	  from	  purely	  stylistical	  consideration	  it	  is	  pos-­‐
sible	   to	  say	  that	   the	  remark	   in	  MS	  116	   is	   later,	  since	  both	  the	  remark	  and	  the	  surrounding	  dis-­‐
cusssion	  is	  quite	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  MS	  119,	  but	  much	  more	  polished	  and	  to	  the	  point.	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übersichtliche	  Darstellung»	   as	   important	   for	   philosophical	   investigations	   is	   not	   new	   to	  
Wittgenstein;	  indeed,	  he	  develops	  it,	  as	  we	  saw,	  already	  in	  the	  early	  1930’s.	  However,	  in	  
his	  work	  up	  until	  1936	  the	  notion	  of	  surveyable	  representation	  or	  synopsis	  of	  trivialities	  
is	   indeed	   connected	   to	   a	   more	   systematic	   notion	   of	   an	   «overview»	   of	   the	   rules	   of	  
grammar,	   or	   different	   language	   games,	   and	   the	   systematic	   presentation	   of	   examples	  
that	  give	  us	  a	  kind	  of	  «birds-­‐eye	  view»	  of	  the	  uses	  of	  a	  concept	  or	  a	  «segment	  of	  gram-­‐
mar	   pertinent	   to	   a	   given	   philosophical	   problem»	   (Glock	   [1996]:	   280).	   The	   comparison	  
between	   philosophical	   clarification	   and	   the	   systematic	   going	   through	   of	   the	   account	  
books	  of	  a	  business	  that	  we	  quoted	  above	  corresponds	  to	  this	  systematic	  idea	  of	  Über-­‐
sichtlichkeit.	  However,	  this	  notion	  is	  understood	  in	  a	  new	  way	  in	  Wittgenstein’s	  «investi-­‐
gations-­‐philosophy»,	  beginning	  in	  the	  autumn	  of	  1936,	  when	  he	  abandoned	  his	  attempt	  
to	   recast	   the	   Brown	   Book,	   simultaneously	   abandoning	   the	   systematic	   book	   form	   and	  
starting	  instead	  to	  work	  in	  a	  radically	  new	  way,	  the	  result	  of	  which	  is	  the	  first	  version	  of	  
the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  Investigations	  (see	  Pichler	  [2004])4.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  claim	  that	  in	  fun-­‐
damentals,	  Wittgenstein’s	   view	   of	   philosophy	   did	   not	   change;	   what	   changed	  was	   the	  
way	  he	  chose	  to	  present	  it.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  he	  let	  his	  thoughts	  «travel	  freely»	  according	  
to	  their	  «natural	  inclination»,	  trying	  to	  not	  «force	  them	  in	  any	  single	  direction»,	  that	  he	  
found	  a	  Darstellungsform	  that	  fitted	  the	  kind	  of	  investigation	  he	  wanted	  to	  make:	  
The	  best	   that	   I	   could	  write	  would	  never	  be	  more	  than	  philosophical	   remarks;	  my	  thoughts	  
were	  soon	  crippled	  if	  I	  tried	  to	  force	  them	  on	  in	  any	  single	  direction	  against	  their	  natural	  in-­‐
clination.	  ‒	  And	  this	  was,	  of	  course,	  connected	  with	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  investigation.	  For	  
this	  compels	  us	  to	  travel	  over	  a	  wide	  field	  of	  thought	  criss-­‐cross	  in	  every	  direction.	  (Wittgen-­‐
stein	  [1953],	  preface,	  first	  version	  written	  in	  August	  1938)	  
So	  I	  would	  claim	  that	  Wittgenstein	  in	  MSS	  116	  and	  119	  gives	  voice	  to	  two,	  partly	  con-­‐
flicting	  inclinations	  he	  has	  regarding	  the	  notion	  of	  übersichtliche	  Darstellungen:	  the	  «sys-­‐
tematic»	   and	   the	   «aesthetic»	   one.	  When	   formulating	   the	   aesthetic	   analogy,	   he	   is	   re-­‐
minding	  himself	  about	  the	  «aesthetic»	  Darstellungsform	  he	  has	  recently	  developed;	  i.e.	  
 
4	  The	  «Urfassung»	  of	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations	  	  (MS	  142)	  was	  finished	  it	  in	  the	  the	  spring	  of	  
1937.	  It	  was	  dictated	  and	  typed	  ,	  and	  	  comprises	  what	  we	  know	  as	  §§	  1-­‐188	  of	  the	  published	  ver-­‐
sion.	   In	   1937-­‐1938	  Wittgenstein	   continued	   this	   project,	  working	  manly	   on	   remarks	   concerning	  
the	  philosophy	  of	  mathematics.	   In	  august	  1938	  he	  dictated	  a	  preface	   to	  a	   typescript	   that	  com-­‐
prised	  what	  we	  know	  as	  the	  «Frühfassung»	  of	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations	  	  (TS	  220	  +	  TS	  221)	  
and	  wrote	   to	  Cambridge	  University	  Press	   inquiring	  about	   their	   interest	   in	  publishing	  a	  bilingual	  
edition	  of	  it	  (that	  he	  wanted	  to	  call	  Philosophische	  Bemerkungen).	  What	  is	  interesting	  here	  is	  that	  
the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  typescript	  deals	  extensively	  with	  themes	  from	  the	  philosophy	  of	  mathe-­‐
matics,	   and	  was	   not	   included	   in	   the	   later	   version	   that	   was	   finally	   printed	   after	  Wittgenstein's	  
death	  (see	  Schulte	  [2001]:	  20-­‐21).	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he	  is	  reflecting	  upon	  his	  new	  «investigations-­‐philosophy»,	  where	  his	  way	  of	  presenting	  
his	  philosophical	  thoughts	  is	  characterized	  or	  «earmarked»	  by	  the	  concept	  of	  eine	  über-­‐
sichtliche	  Darstellung.	  However,	  he	  has	  now	  abandoned	  the	  idea	  that	  this	  means	  aiming	  
at	  some	  kind	  of	  complete	  overview	  and	  systematic	  description	  of	  grammar.	  Instead,	  the	  
emphasis	  is	  on	  a	  making	  something	  übersichtlich	  rather	  than	  on	  a	  representation	  that	  is	  
in	  itself	  «surveyable»	  (Pichler	  [2004]:	  183-­‐184).	  It	  is	  a	  way	  of	  representing	  that	  allows	  us	  
to	   see	   things	   together,	   and	   helps	   locate	   the	   reasons	   for	   our	   puzzlement	   in	   particular	  
cases.	  In	  this	  sense	  the	  übersichtliche	  Darstellung	  is	  less	  a	  result	  than	  an	  attitude	  or	  ac-­‐
tivity	  (Pichler	  [2004]:	  183),	  a	  way	  of	  viewing	  things	  rather	  than	  a	  view	  of	  things	  (Hallett	  
[1977]:	  217),	  an	  opening	  up	  of	  new	  aspects	  and	  alternative	  ways	  of	  seeing.	  It	  is	  a	  meth-­‐
od	   for	   «dissolving	   philosophical	   problems	   by	   effecting	   changes	   of	   aspect»,	   as	   Baker	  
([1991]:	  48)	  puts	   it	   in	  his	   interpretation	  of	   the	   locus	  classicus	   for	   the	  discussion	  of	   this	  
notion,	  Wittgenstein	  (1953):	  §122	  (this	  passage	  can	  be	  found	  both	  in	  the	  Urfassung	  and	  
the	  Frühfassung	  of	  the	  Investigations):	  	  
A	  main	  source	  of	  our	  misunderstanding	   is	  that	  we	  do	  not	  have	  an	  overview	   [übersehen]	  of	  
the	  use	  of	  our	  words.	  ‒	  Our	  grammar	   is	  deficient	   in	  surveyability	   [Übersichtlichkeit].	  A	  sur-­‐
veyable	  representation	  produces	   just	  that	  understanding	  which	  consists	   in	  “seeing	  connec-­‐
tions”.	  Hence	  the	   importance	  of	   finding	  and	   inventing	   intermediate	   links.	  The	  concept	  of	  a	  
surveyable	  	  representation	  is	  of	  fundamental	  significance	  for	  us.	  It	  characterizes	  the	  way	  we	  
represent	  things	  [unsere	  Darstellungsform],	  how	  we	  look	  at	  matters	  (is	  this	  a	  “Weltanschau-­‐
ung”?).	  	  
The	  way	  of	  «looking	  at	  matters»	  that	  Wittgenstein	  talks	  about	  here	  is	  intimately	  con-­‐
nected	  to	  the	  form	  of	  presentation	  of	  the	  Investigations,	  that	  he	  himself	  characterizes	  in	  
the	  preface	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  «criss-­‐cross»	  philosophy.	  This	  view	  is	  also	  reflected	  in	  his	  aban-­‐
donment	  of	  the	  traditional	  linear	  book	  form	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  «album»	  of	  the	  Philosophi-­‐
cal	  Investigations.	  With	  it	  he	  finds	  a	  form	  of	  presentation	  that	  suits	  this	  methodological	  
ideal,	  i.e.	  a	  kind	  of	  investigation	  that	  bears	  a	  «strange	  resemblance»	  to	  an	  aesthetic	  in-­‐
vestigation.	  Compare	   this	   to	  what	  Wittgenstein	   says	   in	  a	   later	  discussion	  about	  aspect	  
perception:	  
In	  conversation	  on	  aesthetic	  matters	  we	  use	  the	  words	  «You	  have	  to	  see	   it	   like	  this,	   this	   is	  
how	   it	   is	  meant»;	  «When	  you	  see	   it	   like	  this,	  you	  see	  where	   it	  goes	  wrong»;	  «You	  have	  to	  
hear	  these	  bars	  as	  an	  introduction»;	  «You	  must	  listen	  out	  for	  this	  key»,	  «You	  must	  phrase	  it	  
like	  this»	  (which	  can	  refer	  to	  hearing	  as	  well	  as	  to	  playing).	  (Wittgenstein	  [1953]:	  202)	  	  
So	  what	  kind	  of	  reasons	  can	  we	  appeal	  to	  in	  such	  cases?	  As	  noted	  earlier,	  one	  possi-­‐
bility	   is	   to	  use	  different	  comparisons	  or	  analogies,	   to	  make	  certain	  connections	  appear	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by	  means	  of	   a	   «synopsis	   of	   trivialities»	  or	   a	   «surveyable	   representation».	   This	   kind	  of	  
reasons,	   if	   persuasive	   (i.e.,	   accepted	   as	   the	   reason	   for	  my	   puzzlement),	   can	   lead	   to	   a	  
shift	   in	  perception,	   to	   the	  dawning	  of	  a	  new	  aspect.	   In	   the	  Frühfassung	   (that	  Wittgen-­‐
stein	  was	  working	   on	  when	   he	   formulated	   the	   aesthetic	   analogy)	   this	   connection	   be-­‐
tween	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  surveyable	  representation	  and	  changing	  our	  way	  of	  thinking,	  and	  
the	  changing	  of	  an	  aspect	  of	  a	  picture	  or	  a	  way	  of	  talking,	  is	  even	  stronger	  than	  in	  the	  fi-­‐
nal,	  printed	  version	  (see	  TS	  220,	  §§98	  ff.;	  cfr.	  Baker	  [1991]:	  48).	  
Why	  Mathematics?	  
So	  why	  does	  Wittgenstein	   single	  out	   a	  philosophical	   investigation	  especially	   in	  mathe-­‐
matics	  when	   formulating	   the	   aesthetic	   analogy?	   A	   trivial	   answer	   is	   that	   he	  was	   quite	  
preoccupied	  with	  themes	  belonging	  to	  the	  philosophy	  of	  mathematics	  at	  the	  time5,	  and	  
that	  the	  «strange	  resemblance»	  struck	  him	  when	  reflecting	  upon	  such	  a	  theme	  (i.e.	  the	  
concept	  of	  the	   infinite).	  But	  why	  does	  he	  think	  that	  precisely	  a	  philosophical	   investiga-­‐
tion	  in	  mathematics	  should	  be	  conducted	  in	  a	  manner	  strangely	  reminiscent	  of	  an	  «aes-­‐
thetic	  investigation»?	  	  
We	  must	   first	  and	   foremost	  note	  that	   the	  analogy	   is	  not	  about	  some	  putative	  resem-­‐
blance	  between	  aesthetics	  and	  mathematics,	  but	  a	  note	  on	  the	  «strange	  resemblance»	  be-­‐
tween	  an	  aesthetic	  investigation	  and	  a	  philosophical	  investigation	  especially	  in	  mathemat-­‐
ics.	  We	  should,	  that	  is,	  be	  careful	  to	  distinguish	  between	  a	  mathematical	  investigation	  and	  
a	   philosophical	   investigation	   in	   mathematics6.	   The	   investigation	   Wittgenstein	   is	   talking	  
about	   in	  connection	   to	   the	  quote	   from	  Hardy	   is	  undoubtedly	  what	  he	  means	  by	  a	  philo-­‐
sophical	  investigation	  in	  mathematics.	  But	  what	  is	  the	  object	  of	  such	  an	  investigation?	  It	  is	  
not	  mathematics,	  but	  what	  we	  are	  tempted	  to	  say	  about	  mathematics,	  that	  is	  the	  «raw	  
material»	  for	  philosophy:	  
Thus,	  for	  example,	  what	  a	  mathematician	  is	  inclined	  to	  say	  about	  the	  objectivity	  and	  reality	  
of	  mathematical	  facts,	   is	  not	  a	  philosophy	  of	  mathematics,	  but	  something	  for	  philosophical	  
treatment.	  (Wittgenstein	  [1953]:	  §254)	  
 
5	  At	  the	  time	  Wittgenstein	  wrote	  down	  the	  aesthetic	  analogy	  his	  version	  of	  the	  Philosophical	  In-­‐
vestigations	  was	  quite	  different	  from	  the	  book	  as	  we	  know	  it:	  much	  shorter	  and	  containing	  a	  sub-­‐
stantive	  part	  dedicated	  to	  themes	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  mathematics	  (cfr.	  note	  3	  above).	  	  
6	  In	  the	  same	  manner	  as	  we	  should	  distinguish	  between	  an	  aesthetic	  investigation	  and	  an	  investi-­‐
gation	  in	  aesthetics	  (see	  note	  1	  above).	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Wittgenstein	  formulated	  a	  similar	  idea	  already	  in	  the	  early	  1930s:	  	  «Philosophy	  does	  not	  
review	  the	  calculi	  of	  mathematics,	  but	  only	  what	  mathematicians	  say	  about	  these	  calculi»	  
(MS	  113,	  108r).	  Philosophy	  will	  not	  interfere	  with	  the	  mathematical	  theory	  or	  calculus,	  but	  
is	  rather	  concerned	  with	  what	  we	  (especially	  mathematicians	  and	  philosophers)	  tend	  to	  say	  
about	  mathematics,	  what	  kind	  of	  pictures,	  analogies	  and	  conceptions	  of	  the	  symbolism	  our	  
use	  of	  words	  reveals.	  These	  pictures	  and	  analogies	  can,	  in	  turn,	  tempt	  us	  to	  formulate	  phil-­‐
osophical	  statements	  about	  mathematics	  that	  can	  be	  severely	  misleading.	  Thus,	  «the	  finite	  
cannot	  understand	  the	  infinite»	  is	  not	  (yet)	  an	  example	  of	  philosophy	  of	  mathematics	  ‒	  
however,	   for	   instance	   such	   ways	   of	   speaking	   about	   infinity	   are	   the	   raw	   material	   for	  
Wittgenstein’s	   philosophical	   reflections	   about	   mathematics	   and	   his	   treatment	   of	   the	  
philosophical	  questions	  such	  ways	  of	  talking	  can	  give	  rise	  to.	  
Any	   attempts	   to	   understand	   Wittgenstein’s	   general	   pronouncements	   about	   philoso-­‐
phy’s	   aims	  and	  methods	   should	  of	   course	  be	   supplanted	  by	   close	  attention	   to	  his	   actual	  
philosophical	  practice.	  A	  more	  detailed	  look	  at	  different	  concrete	  examples	  of	  his	  investiga-­‐
tions	  would	  therefore	  be	  needed	  at	  this	  point.	  However,	  we	  will	  here	  have	  to	  be	  content	  
with	  a	   few	  glimpses	  of	  ways	   in	  which	  the	  aesthetic	  analogy	  can	   illuminate	  Wittgenstein’s	  
philosophical	  investigations	  in	  this	  area.	  	  
Even	  though	  he	  does	  not	  explicitly	  discuss	  philosophical	  investigations	  in	  his	  lectures	  
on	  aesthetics,	  where	  he	  gives	  several	  examples	  of	  «aesthetic	  investigations»,	  he	  does	  in	  
fact	  in	  passing	  (at	  the	  end	  of	  his	  third	  lecture)	  touch	  upon	  an	  issue	  relating	  to	  the	  philos-­‐
ophy	  of	  mathematics.	   Interestingly,	   this	   occurs	  when	  he	   characterizes	   his	   own	  way	  of	  
philosophizing	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  «persuasion»,	   in	  which	  he	  wants	  to	  «draw	  attention	  to	  cer-­‐
tain	  differences»	  and	  get	  his	   interlocutors	  to	  «look	  at	  things	  in	  another	  way.»	  Here,	  he	  
considers	   Cantor’s	   statements	   about	   transfinite	   set	   theory	   as	   an	   example	   of	   a	  way	   of	  
thinking	  he	  wants	  to	  combat.	  He	  says	  that	  he	   is,	   in	  a	  sense,	  making	  «propaganda	  for	  a	  
style	   of	   thinking	   as	   opposed	   to	   another»	   and	   that	   he	   is	   «honestly	   disgusted	  with	   the	  
other»,	  i.e.	  Cantor’s.	  Cantor’s	  proof	  and	  manner	  of	  expression	  has	  «no	  charm»	  for	  him—
he	  «hates	  it»,	  and	  he	  wants	  to	  put	  for	  instance	  an	  expression	  like	  «the	  Cardinal	  number	  
of	  all	  Cardinal	  numbers»	   in	  a	  way	  «in	  which	   it	  will	   lose	   its	  charm».	  This	  means	  that	  he	  
wants	  to	  show	  how	  misleading	  such	  expressions	  are:	  
If	  we	  explain	  the	  surroundings	  of	  the	  expression	  we	  see	  that	  the	  thing	  could	  have	  been	  ex-­‐
pressed	  in	  an	  entirely	  different	  way.	  I	  can	  put	  it	  in	  a	  way	  in	  which	  it	  will	  lose	  its	  charm	  for	  a	  
great	  number	  of	  people	  and	  certainly	  will	  lose	  its	  charm	  for	  me.	  (Wittgenstein	  [1938]:	  28)	  
I	  would	  like	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  form	  of	  expression	  Wittgenstein	  is	  referring	  to	  here	  is	  pre-­‐
cisely	  a	  kind	  of	  «synopsis»	  that	  will	  help	  us	  to	  see	  the	  matter	  in	  another	  light.	  And	  I	  would	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argue	   that	   it	   is	   such	  an	  «aesthetic»	   form	  of	  presentation	   that	  Wittgenstein	  himself	  uses,	  
both	  in	  his	  manuscripts	  from	  the	  late	  1930s7	  and	  especially	  in	  his	  lectures	  on	  the	  founda-­‐
tions	  of	  mathematics	  in	  1939,	  when	  he	  deals	  for	  instance	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  infinity.	  This	  
kind	  of	  investigation	  can	  be	  contrasted	  to	  one	  aiming	  at	  a	  «complete	  overview»	  and	  «all-­‐
sided	  lighting».	  	  
According	   to	  Wittgenstein,	   what	   leads	   to	   philosophical	   problems	   or	   «puzzlement»	   is	  
Cantor's	  statements	  about	  his	  «discovery».	  We	  do	  not	  have	  to	  do	  with	  a	  mistake	  (i.e.,	  that	  
Cantor	  would	  say	  something	  false),	  but	  with	  a	  way	  of	  thinking	  and	  talking	  which	  lends	  the	  
concepts	   of	   set	   theory	   a	   false	   and	  misleading,	   or	   even	   (Wittgenstein	   claims)	   dangerous	  
charm.	  The	  problem	  he	  wants	  to	  point	  out	   is	  that	  what	   is	  said	  about	  mathematics	  (num-­‐
bers,	  calculations,	  proof,	  etc.)	  can	  help	  create	  a	  mythology	  that	  gives	  a	  charm	  to	  the	  num-­‐
bers	  or	  calculi	  but	  also	  contributes	  to	  obscure	  their	  use	  in	  mathematics,	  i.e.	  what	  actually	  
determines	  their	  significance.	  Wittgenstein's	   treatment	  aims	  at	   freeing	  us	   from	  such	  mis-­‐
leading	  pictures,	  which	  requires	  that	  we	  ourselves	  realize	  that	  we	  were	  misled	  and	  could	  
not	  see	  clearly.	  Therefore	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  dogmatically	  proclaim	  that	  something	  is	  mis-­‐
guided	  or	  that	  someone	  uses	  a	  wrong	  concept.	  Wittgenstein	  says	  repeatedly	  in	  his	  lectures	  
on	   the	   foundations	   of	  mathematics	   that	   he	   does	   not	   try	   to	   persuade	   anyone	   to	   change	  
opinions.	  Opinions	  have	  to	  do	  with	  facts,	  and	  he	  does	  not	  want	  to	  bring	  forward	  new	  facts:	  
«I	  am	  only	  trying	  to	  recommend	  a	  certain	  sort	  of	  investigation»	  (Wittgenstein	  [1939]:	  103).	  
It	   is	  this	  kind	  of	  investigation	  which	  exhibits	  a	  «strange	  resemblance»	  to	  an	  «aesthetic	  in-­‐
vestigation»,	   and	   it	  does	  often	   consist	  of	   introducing	  different	   types	  of	   comparisons	  and	  
analogies.	  But	   it	   is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  Wittgenstein	  would	  argue	  that	  his	  own	  pictures	  and	  
analogies	  are	  necessarily	  true,	  or	  more	  accurate	  than	  those	  he	  believes	  are	  misleading.	  In-­‐
stead,	  they	  provide	  an	  object	  of	  comparison	  that	  can	  function	  as	  contrast,	  or	  an	  «antidote»	  
that	  can	  counter	  the	  misleading	  analogies	  and	  pictures	  we	  have	  created	  for	  ourselves.	  Nei-­‐
ther	   is	  he	  claiming	   that	   this	   kind	  of	   investigation	   results	   in	  a	  «complete»	  overview	  or	  an	  
«all-­‐sided	  lighting».	  Instead,	  Wittgenstein	  is	  explicit	  about	  being	  engaged	  in	  a	  kind	  of	  per-­‐
suasion,	  or	  even	  «propaganda	  for	  a	  style	  of	  thinking	  as	  opposed	  to	  another»	  (Wittgenstein	  
[1938]:	  28).	  
A	  similar	  aim	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  his	  treatment	  of	  another	  central	  theme	  in	  the	  philosophy	  of	  
mathematics,	   i.e.	  mathematical	  proof.	  When	  Wittgenstein	  maintains	  that	   in	  mathematics	  
«surveyablity	  [Übersichtlichkeit]	  belongs	  to	  proof»	  (TS	  221,	  §243;	  cfr.	  Wittgenstein	  [1939]:	  I,	  
§154)	  	  this	  clearly	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  some	  kind	  of	  systematic	  and	  «complete»	  overview;	  in-­‐
 
7	  I’m	  here	  referring	  to	  MSS	  117,	  118	  and	  119	  (from	  the	  autumn	  of	  1937),	  and	  MS	  121	  (from	  1938-­‐
39),	  which	  are	  partly	  published	  in	  Wittgenstein	  [1939].	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deed,	   in	   his	   discussions	   of	   proof	  Wittgenstein	   especially	   criticizes	   the	   logicistic	   idea	   that	  
mathematical	  proof	  is	  a	  process	  of	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  reasoning,	  ultimately	  reducible	  to	  a	  logical	  
structure.	  When	  he	  insists	  on	  the	  «surveyability»	  of	  mathematical	  proof,	  he	  means	  that	  a	  
proof	  shows	  us	  something	  in	  a	  convincing	  way.	  By	  a	  mathematical	  proof	  one	  is	  brought	  to	  
see	  something;	  it	  must	  show	  us	  how	  to	  reach	  a	  solution,	  not	  simply	  that	  a	  problem	  has	  a	  so-­‐
lution.	  So	  it	  is	  for	  instance	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  Übersichtlichkeit	  in	  mathematics	  bears	  a	  close	  
resemblance	  to	  Übersichtliche	  Darstellungen	  in	  philosophical	  investigations	  (as	  Juliet	  Floyd	  
notes	   in	   the	   quotation	   adduced	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   this	   paper;	   cfr.	   Floyd	   [2000],	   and	  
Mühlhölzer	  [2005]).	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  philosophical	  investigation	  is	  to	  locate	  and	  describe	  the	  
reasons	  for	  our	  accepting	  something	  proffered	  as	  a	  proof.	  This	  discussion	  of	  proof	  also	  al-­‐
lows	  us	  to	  glimpse	  a	  «strange	  resemblance»	  between	  the	  nature	  of	  mathematical	  rules	  and	  
the	  nature	  of	  «aesthetic	  rules»	  (that	  Wittgenstein	  discusses	  in	  his	  lectures	  on	  aesthetics).	  
My	  conclusion	  is	  that	  Wittgenstein	  calls	  special	  attention	  to	  mathematics	  in	  the	  aesthet-­‐
ic	  analogy	  partly	  because	  he	  was,	  at	  the	  time,	  preoccupied	  with	  themes	  in	  the	  philosophy	  
of	  mathematics,	  partly	  because	  he	  obviously	  thought	  (for	  reasons	  discussed	  above)	  that	  it	  
is	   in	   particular	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   themes	   in	   the	   philosophy	   of	   mathematics	   that	   the	  
«strange	   resemblance»	   between	   a	   philosophical	   investigation	   and	   an	   aesthetic	   one	   be-­‐
comes	  evident8.	  And	  indeed	  also	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  remarks	  on	  mathematics	  display	  the	  
«criss-­‐crossing»	  nature	  that	  he	  thinks	  is	  essential	  for	  his	  way	  of	  thinking.	  
The	  Aesthetic	  Analogy	  and	  Wittgenstein's	  Later	  Philosophy	  
In	   the	   preceding	   sections	   I	   claimed	   that	   the	   aesthetic	   analogy	   can	   be	   understood	   as	  
Wittgenstein’s	  reflection	  upon	  the	  kind	  of	  «criss-­‐cross	  philosophy»	  and	  the	  Darstellungs-­‐
form	  appropriate	  to	  it	  that	  he	  was	  developing	  at	  the	  time.	  I	  also	  claimed	  that	  the	  paren-­‐
thesis	   «(perhaps	   especially	   in	  mathematics)»	   can	  be	  explained	  by	   looking	   at	   his	   philo-­‐
sophical	  activity	  at	  that	  time.	  From	  this	  perspective	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  he	  still	  in	  
late	  1937	  presents	  the	  systematic	  way	  of	  understanding	  eine	  übersichtliche	  Darstellung	  
as	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  «aesthetic»	  way.	  However,	  I	  also	  think	  that	  scope	  of	  the	  aesthet-­‐
ic	  analogy	  can	  be	  understood	   in	  a	  broader	  sense,	   i.e.	  not	   just	  as	  a	   reflection	  upon	  the	  
work	  in	  philosophy	  he	  was	  involved	  in	  at	  precisely	  that	  time,	  but	  as	  having	  in	  addition	  a	  
forward-­‐looking	  or	  programmatic	  dimension:	   it	   is	   conceivable	   that	  Wittgenstein	  wants	  
 
8	  	  For	  instance	  Wittgenstein’s	  way	  of	  dealing	  with	  the	  question	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  «open	  problems»	  
in	  mathematics	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  example	  of	  this.	  See	  Säätelä	  (2011).	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to	  remind	  himself	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  «strange	  resemblance»	  in	  order	  to	  carry	  
on	   this	   kind	   of	   in	   investigation	  when	   continuing	   his	   work.	   Thus	   the	   analogy	   could	   be	  
seen	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  declaration	  of	  intent	  regarding	  the	  future,	  and	  not	  just	  as	  a	  reflection	  
on	  his	  current	  philosophical	  work	  in	  1937.	  
So	  I	  would	  like	  to	  claim	  that	  both	  the	  Investigations	  and	  the	  post-­‐Investigations	  phi-­‐
losophy	  can	  be	  profitably	  understood	   in	  the	   light	  of	  this	  analogy,	  and	   in	  this	  sense	  the	  
aesthetic	  analogy	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  describing	  a	  Leitmotiv	  for	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philoso-­‐
phy.	  In	  this	  work	  he	  moves	  more	  and	  more	  away	  from	  the	  view	  of	  a	  surveyable	  presen-­‐
tation	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  complete,	  systematic	  mapping	  of	  «the	  account	  books	  of	   language»,	  
towards	  a	  conception	  that	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  aesthetic	  (in	  the	  sense	  discussed).	  
Therefore	   it	   is	  not	  an	  exaggeration	  to	  say,	  with	  Cyril	  Barrett,	   that	  aesthetics	  can	  be	  
viewed	  as	  Wittgenstein’s	  «paradigm	  of	  philosophy»	  ‒	  as	  he	  conceived	  it.	  In	  fact,	  we	  can	  
find	  that	  Wittgenstein,	   in	  some	  of	  his	  very	   last	  writings	  (MS	  172,	  written	   in	  1951,	  pub-­‐
lished	  as	  part	  of	  On	  Certainty),	   gives	  a	  new	  version	  of	   the	  aesthetic	  analogy,	   this	   time	  
comparing	   a	  philosophical	   investigation	  with	   art	   criticism	   (which,	   as	  we	  noted,	   can	  be	  
understood	  as	  a	  central	  example	  of	  «an	  aesthetic	  investigation»):	  
But	  is	  it	  an	  adequate	  answer	  to	  the	  scepticism	  of	  the	  idealist,	  or	  the	  assurances	  of	  the	  realist,	  
to	  say	  that	  «There	  are	  physical	  objects»	  is	  nonsense?	  For	  them	  after	  all	  it	  is	  not	  nonsense.	  It	  
would,	  however,	  be	  an	  answer	  to	  say:	  this	  assertion,	  or	  its	  opposite	  is	  a	  misfiring	  attempt	  to	  
express	  what	  can't	  be	  expressed	  like	  that.	  And	  that	  it	  does	  misfire	  can	  be	  shown;	  but	  that	  is-­‐
n't	  the	  end	  of	  the	  matter.	  We	  need	  to	  realize	  that	  what	  presents	  itself	  to	  us	  as	  the	  first	  ex-­‐
pression	  of	  a	  difficulty,	  or	  of	  its	  solution,	  may	  as	  yet	  not	  be	  correctly	  expressed	  at	  all.	  Just	  as	  
one	  who	  has	  a	  just	  censure	  of	  a	  picture	  to	  make	  will	  often	  at	  first	  offer	  the	  censure	  where	  it	  
does	  not	  belong,	  and	  an	  investigation	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  find	  the	  right	  point	  of	  attack	  for	  
the	  critic.	  (Wittgenstein	  [1950-­‐51]:	  §	  37;	  my	  emphasis)	  
Saying	  that	  it	  makes	  no	  sense	  either	  to	  deny	  or	  affirm	  that	  there	  are	  physical	  objects	  
is	  not	  an	  adequate	  response	  to	  the	  sceptic’s	  challenge.	   Instead,	   it	  must	  be	  shown	   that	  
such	   an	   expression	   will	   «misfire»	   in	   different	   ways,	   and	   this	   has	   to	   be	   «correctly	   ex-­‐
pressed»	   in	  order	   to	  be	  efficient.	   It	   is	   this	  kind	  of	   investigation	   (which	   involves	   real	  or	  
imagined	  examples,	  «intermediate	  cases»,	  and	  so	  on)	  by	  means	  of	  a	  «perspicuous	  rep-­‐
resentation»,	   that	  Wittgenstein	   wants	   to	   compare	   to	   an	   «aesthetic	   investigation»,	   in	  
this	  case	  the	  activity	  of	  an	  art	  critic	  attempting	  to	  find	  «the	  right	  point	  of	  attack»	  for	  her	  
assessment	   of	   a	   picture,	   i.e.,	   formulate	   the	   reasons	   that	   are	   persuasive.	  We	   can	   also	  
note,	   that	  he	   repeats	   the	  point	   (from	  MS	  119,	   89r)	   about	   a	  «false	  explanation»	  being	  
useful	  when	  you	  want	  to	  find	  the	  correct	  one.	  So	  it	  is	  not	  the	  activity	  of	  a	  «chartered	  ac-­‐
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countant»,	  but	  that	  of	  an	  art	  critic,	  that	  remains	  as	  Wittgenstein's	  paradigm	  for	  a	  philo-­‐
sophical	  investigation.	  	  
Finally,	   a	   caveat:	  when	   considering	   these	   similarities	  we	   should	   remember	   that	  we	  
have	  to	  do	  with	  an	  analogy,	  so	  we	  should	  not	   look	  for	  exact	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  identity.	  Witt-­‐
genstein	  is	  not	  claiming	  that	  «a	  philosophical	  investigation	  (in	  mathematics)»	  is	  «an	  aes-­‐
thetic	   investigation»;	  we	  do	  not	  have	   to	  do	  with	  a	  scandalous	  «aesthetisation»	  of	  phi-­‐
losophy	  or	  mathematics	  ‒	  there	  is	  a	  resemblance,	  but	  it	  is	  seltsam:	  it	  should	  strike	  us	  as	  
something	   odd	  or	   peculiar,	   i.e.,	   something	   out	   of	   the	   ordinary,	   something	  we	  did	   not	  
expect	   to	   find.	  This	  also	  means	   that	  we	  should	  not	  be	  oblivious	  of	   the	  differences	  be-­‐
tween	  these	  kinds	  of	  investigations,	  and	  that	  we	  should	  not	  look	  at	  these	  particular	  ex-­‐
amples	  as	   the	  prototype	   for	  all	   cases.	  After	  all,	   there	   is	  «an	  extraordinary	  number»	  of	  
different	  cases	  of	  aesthetic	  appreciation	  (Wittgenstein	  [1938]:	  7).	  There	  is	  no	  essence	  to	  
aesthetics;	  what	   belongs	   to	   aesthetics	   is	   an	   «immensely	   complicated	   family	   of	   cases»	  
(Wittgenstein	   [1938]:	   10)	   ‒	  we	   should	   not	   expect	   there	   to	   be	   any	   single	   common	  de-­‐
nominator	  to	  everything	  we	  call	   for	   instance	  «aesthetic	  appreciation»	  or	  «aesthetic	   in-­‐
vestigations».	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  precisely	  in	  this	  sense	  also	  that	  aesthetics	  resembles	  philoso-­‐
phy:	  there	  is	  not	  a	  single	  method	  of	  philosophy;	  neither	  is	  there	  a	  clearly	  delimited	  set	  
of	  problems	  that	  makes	  up	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  philosophy.	  
So	  how	  are	  we	  to	  sum	  up	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  analogy?	  It	  should	  be	  clear	  
that	  we	  do	  not	  have	  to	  do	  with	  theses	  about	  (the	  essence	  of)	  mathematics,	  aesthetics,	  
or	  philosophy.	  Neither	  is	  the	  later	  Wittgenstein’s	  aim	  to	  introduce	  an	  alternative	  theory	  
or	  new	  methodology	  (this	  can	  be	  contrasted	  to	  the	  fairly	  ambitious	  notion	  of	  method	  he	  
seems	   to	  have	  had	  when	  he	   first	   introduced	   this	   comparison	   in	   the	  1930-­‐33	   lectures).	  
The	  point	  of	  comparing	  a	  philosophical	  investigation	  and	  an	  aesthetic	  one	  is,	  instead,	  to	  
free	  us	  from	  some	  potentially	  misleading	  ways	  of	  looking	  at	  philosophy	  and	  its	  methods	  
by	  giving	  a	  new,	  unexpected	  and	  surprising	  perspective,	  and	  thus	  help	  to	  battle	  the	  dan-­‐
ger	  of	  dogmatism	  in	  philosophy.	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